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Ukrainian forces exploiting Telegram data for battlefield intel

Ukrainian forces can exploit Telegram data for military purposes, Russia’s Federal Security Service has claimed

Telegram could meet all of Roskomnadzor’s requirements in month

Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy Andrey Svintsov stressed that Telegram has begun actively complying with illegal content blocking requirements

The Kremlin spent years building a messenger to replace Telegram. Now it’s reportedly telling soldiers the substitute is too insecure to use at the front.

Russian troops fighting in Ukraine have been advised to stop using Max — the Kremlin-backed “national messenger” app designed to replace Telegram — because it is not secure enough, the independent outlet Mediazona reports. The guidance comes as federal authorities have been throttling Telegram since summer 2025, triggering a backlash from pro-war commentators who say the app remains soldiers’ most reliable means of frontline communication. The Federal Security Service (FSB) has warned separately that Ukrainian forces can intercept Telegram traffic.

Kremlin spokesman admits Putin’s press service uses a VPN to bypass Russia’s Telegram restrictions

The Kremlin intends to maintain its official Telegram channel, even as Russia increases restrictions on the platform, spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Thursday.

Listen to the BBC at Night. Russian authorities continue to block Telegram, while simultaneously limiting propaganda capabilities. Soviet officials also struggled with radio

For Russian citizens, Telegram is no longer just a messenger. It is a full-fledged mass media, one of the main platforms for receiving news, discussing public events, and exchanging opinions. The motives of the state, which is trying to block the platform, are understandable: at least to transfer users to the controlled Max application, and in the long term, to bring Russian society under total information control. A VEF Radio radiola (Riga, 1972), presented at the opening of the Museum of Radio and Television, Moscow, March 27, 2024. Photo: Vasily Kuzmicheonok / AGN "Moscow". It is quite obvious that such measures will inevitably worsen the quality of life for Russians. At the same time, they will almost certainly interfere with Russian propaganda itself, as many pro-government media and channels actively use Telegram as the main platform for disseminating their messages. Not to mention that participants of the "SVO" often use Telegram for communication. In this sense, the current situation is largely reminiscent of the blocking of Western radio stations during the USSR. Then, the Soviet leadership, on the one hand, sought to limit the penetration of Western information and culture, and on the other hand, weakened its own broadcasting and propaganda system. Already in the first post-war decade, a massive radiofication campaign began in the USSR. In 1955, the total number of radios in the country reached 33 million, and ten years later, this figure doubled. These were no longer street loudspeakers, but autonomous wireless receivers. „ So, if earlier listening to the radio was a collective practice (for example, on the street), now it has become an individual activity, much more difficult to account for, observe, and control. Moreover, these receivers had a serious "shortcoming" - they could receive short-wave transmissions. This meant, as the head of Glavradio A. Puzin complained, that with their help it was possible to listen not only to Soviet but also to foreign programs with "vile slander against the Soviet Union." But the production of radios with short-wave capabilities continued anyway, as such receivers were the fastest way to bring radio to the people, especially in villages where there was often no electricity and the necessary infrastructure. And a short-wave receiver could work in such conditions. "VEF Spidola-10" radio receiver, intended for the domestic market. Photo: Pudelek / Wikimedia (CC BY-SA 3.0). In 1958, the Central Committee conducted an investigation: it turned out that up to 85 percent of short-wave receivers were located in the European part of the USSR, where, as officials noted, "there was nothing to listen to except enemy radio." Moreover, by the end of the 1950s, about sixty foreign radio stations could be heard on the territory of the USSR. The Soviet leadership had to use a "jamming" system. The costs of "jamming" were colossal - "hundreds of millions of rubles," according to Central Committee officials. This amount exceeded the USSR's expenses on domestic and international broadcasting combined. But despite the entire jamming system, in many places outside Moscow and Leningrad, "enemy voices" could be heard without much difficulty. Moreover, due to jamming, republican and all-Union radio did not work in many places - it turned out that the system limited itself. As a result, "enemy radio" essentially remained the only accessible one, and sometimes collective farmers listened to "Voice of America" and BBC in their villages. In 1953, the Council of Ministers announced the accelerated construction of radio jamming stations. In response, the US, UK, and other foreign broadcasters developed effective ways to bypass blockages - for example, they broadcast on waves as close as possible to Soviet ones. The USSR built even more jamming stations. But by the mid-1950s, the Soviet side was clearly losing this war. „ One Soviet official admitted that even with "unlimited funds," it was impossible to isolate the USSR from foreign radio broadcasts, and jamming threatened to paralyze the Soviet radio network itself. Many Soviet citizens tried to tune into foreign radio themselves. In the 1960s and 1970s, many Soviet citizens bought high-quality radios - the Latvian "Spidola" or, if possible, the German "Grundig." People turned the receiver on its side or upside down, stuck the antennas out the window; and even left big cities for dachas, where jamming was less effective. "We even listened to Vatican Radio, which gave a good overview of what was happening in the Soviet Union, and we were not bothered that the announcer at the end added 'God bless you,'" recalled historian Sergey Ivanov about his experience. When the Soviet army invaded Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, vacationers listened to news on the beaches of the Baltic Sea. Political scientist Masha Lipman, who was in Lithuania at the time, recalled: "That summer, antennas soared everywhere on the beach. And in our circles, if they said they heard about it 'on the radio,' it meant only one thing - the Russian-language broadcasts of 'Voice of America,' BBC, or 'Deutsche Welle.'" Technician at the control panel of "Radio Free Europe" and "Radio Liberty" stations in Munich, West Germany, August 11, 1977. News broadcasts in 22 languages to the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries were broadcast from here. Photo: AP / Scanpix / LETA. Listening to foreign radio in itself was not a crime. It all depended on who listened to what. Estonians, for example, listened to Finnish radio, residents of Tajikistan listened to religious broadcasts from Iran, and Siberians learned about the cultural revolution in Beijing. In 1957, a young Ukrainian plumber was arrested under Article 58 for "recounting foreign radio broadcasts and anti-Soviet poems to workers since the summer of 1956." At the same time, in 1968, a man on an Estonian beach accidentally broadcast a "Voice of America" report to the entire beach - his receiver turned out to be connected to the public address system. But he managed to avoid punishment. Soviet authorities did not know exactly what percentage of citizens listened to foreign broadcasts. In the mid-1970s, the KGB cited a study by the USSR Academy of Sciences, according to which 80% of Moscow students listened to foreign radio stations. Some students posted texts rewritten from BBC broadcasts on the walls of institutes. „ Others openly asked officials when they visited universities: "What is shameful about a person listening to the BBC? Who is interfering with broadcasts from abroad and why?" In 1958, Soviet industry nevertheless stopped producing short-wave receivers with high-frequency ranges. Then listeners began to use low-frequency "evening bands." It is not for nothing that the famous rhyming saying appeared at that time: "There is a custom in Russia - to listen to the BBC at night." The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and the policy of glasnost put an end to the jamming of foreign radio stations. Based on: Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

Russian official claims Telegram crackdown was motivated by “foreign intelligence services’ access to correspondence”

Earlier today, Russia’s Minister of Digital Development, Maksut Shadayev, outlined the reasons behind the slowing of the Telegram messaging app in the country, claiming the move was tied to the service’s “systematic and constant violation of the requirements of federal law

Kiev can receive information posted on Telegram

The spokesperson said that the use of Telegram by the Russian army in the area of a special military operation in the last three months threatened the lives of military personnel

FACTBOX: Telegram blocking speculation and mass channel crackdown

Roskomnadzor’s press service stated that the agency has nothing to add to previously published information regarding the possible blocking of Telegram

Out of Reach. Russian Military Without Starlink and Telegram. How the blocking of terminals and disruptions in the messenger's operation affect the front line

After Elon Musk disabled Starlink terminals for Russian troops and the Kremlin authorities began to slow down Telegram, the Russian army's offensive slowed down, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine, on the contrary, went on the counteroffensive in some sectors of the front. "Novaya Gazeta Europe" tried to find out what Russians are replacing American satellite communications with and how they plan to manage without their usual messenger. Russian servicemen in the Sumy direction, February 10, 2026. Photo: Sergey Bobylev / Sputnik / Scanpix / LETA. Minister of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation Makus Shadaev stated at a meeting of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy that the Russian authorities decided not to restrict the operation of the Telegram messenger in the special operation zone for now. "But we hope that in some time our military will be able to reconfigure and switch to Russian services," said the official. According to Shadaev, at the beginning of the special operation, the military used Telegram as it was considered an anonymous service. However, as the official stated, today there are many facts indicating that foreign special services have access to correspondence in this messenger, and they use the obtained data to conduct combat operations against the Russian army. Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Alexey Krivoruchko, in turn, denies that the disabling of Starlink terminals had a significant impact on the command and control system of the Russian troops in the combat zone. "Starlink terminals have been disabled for two weeks now, but this has not affected the intensity and effectiveness of unmanned systems troops, which is confirmed by objective control data on the destruction of enemy equipment and manpower," said Krivoruchko. According to the deputy minister's statement, Starlink in the "SVO" zone was used only by individual units of the Russian Armed Forces, using the satellite system primarily to mislead the enemy. Telegram is "slowing down." "Communication has never been a strong point of the Russian army, and many initiatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in this area have not been fully implemented," says a military analyst from The Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) to "Novaya-Europe," who agreed to communicate on condition of anonymity. "During the war, life has forced all these processes to be established, especially where life depends on communication, as the military themselves are interested in this. Telegram was traditionally popular in the Russian Federation, so most people have this messenger. It is undemanding to the devices it is installed on and to the quality of communication, and it also has a large set of functions. So, it can be said that the Russian military until recently did not have much choice. Other messengers can be used to replace Telegram, as there is no fundamental difference. It will just be slower, more inconvenient, and without some convenient set of functions. Plus, it will take time for everyone to switch to the new messenger, share contacts, create groups, and so on. Well, the question remains open as to how completely Telegram is blocked. For now, as we understand it, it is still working to some extent." A source in the Russian armed forces tells "Novaya-Europe" that despite Deputy Minister Shadaev's statements, Telegram continues to "slow down" in his unit, with images and videos loading very slowly. At the same time, the military is in no hurry to switch to the MAX messenger imposed by the authorities. The main reason is the promised transparency of the messenger: not everyone wants the command to be able to fully control communication on the front lines. "On the ground, we often see better which orders from the headquarters need to be followed and which ones should be postponed," says a Russian officer. "Besides, events often happen at the front that generals are better off not knowing about. Reports sent to superiors do not always reflect the real combat situation. If this comes to light, many commanders will lose their stars, and some will go to court. So, for now, their own command represents a more serious and real danger, while the machinations of the enemy's digital intelligence remain an ephemeral threat." Starlink terminal. Photo: Nina Lyashonok / Ukrinform / ddp / Scanpix / LETA. No Analogues "For a long time, almost all front-line interaction and communication in the Russian troops were based on the use of 'gray' Starlink terminals as the primary means of communication," says Alexander Kovalenko, a military-political observer for the "Information Resistance" group, to "Novaya-Europe." "At the same time, the use of Starlink is impossible in Russia itself; it is programmatically blocked within the country. But as soon as the terminal approached the border with Ukraine, it started working. The presence of 'gray' Starlink terminals in Ukraine allowed Russian troops to organize not only high-quality satellite communication between their units but also to actively use them for strikes deep into Ukraine's rear. Almost all assault operations of Russian small tactical groups were carried out within stable communication via Starlink. The entire offensive campaign of the Russians in 2025 was tied to the use of this means of communication." In addition, Alexander Kovalenko says that in late 2025 and early 2026, Russian troops began to actively use Starlink terminals for deployment on tactical-level strike drones Molniya-2, on Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, BM-35 "Italmas," as well as decoys like "Gerber." This made Russian drones invulnerable to electronic warfare and allowed operators to control them in real time with minimal signal delay. Thus, according to Alexander Kovalenko, having lost stable satellite communication, the Russians, despite trying to use their own equipment, failed. For one simple reason: Russia has no analogue to Starlink. There are only communication systems of previous generations, significantly inferior in quality to Starlink, and therefore unable to fully replace it. Currently, the Russian army is switching to classic combined-arms communication, trying to establish communication between units both at the 2022 level and taking into account modern trends. In particular, Russian troops are actively building WiFi bridges and switching to satellite internet based on Yamal and Express satellites. In addition, tests of stratospheric 5G platforms of the "Barrazh-1" project have begun. Alexander Kovalenko claims that Russia, critically dependent on NATO technologies in military matters, suddenly found itself cut off from their use and began to sharply "sag" at the front. All the solutions that the Russian command is currently trying to find will, of course, help them restore communication, but they will never achieve the quality level of Starlink. The Russian troops have been thrown back a generation in communication matters, and this has immediately affected their position on the battlefield. In turn, the Ukrainian troops took advantage of this situation in a timely manner, thereby disrupting the Russians' medium-term plans for preparation for the spring-summer offensive. Sow Chaos "Starlink was not only the basis of combined-arms communication for the Russians, actively used at all echelons, from the front line, the near rear zone, and deeper, but also provided Russian troops with systematic strikes into Ukraine's rear," continues Alexander Kovalenko. "Its disabling sowed real chaos in the Russian troops and disorganized them for a certain period. And it was precisely this that the Ukrainian troops took advantage of, launching systematic counterattacks that allowed them to achieve certain successes at the tactical level. As a result, the Russian army was pushed back in the Dnipropetrovsk region from Novoaleksandrivka, Verbove, and Vishneve. In Zaporizhzhia, the Russians were not only driven out of the outskirts of Ternovate and Kosovtseve but also pushed to the left bank of the Gaychur River. In the Stepnohirsk region, the Russian army was driven out of Prymorske and Lukianivka, where they were trying to consolidate in the area of the "Stepnohirsky" landscape reserve." "As for Starlink, the Russians are using all other available means to provide internet," says a CIT analyst. "Where the situation allows, they are laying fiber optic cables to headquarters and command posts. Where not, they can establish radio bridges, in particular, Ubiquiti system equipment is quite common, as well as mesh networks, including with the help of UAV relays. All this, of course, is less convenient, requires significant labor costs, and can also be much easier to detect and destroy. But the Russian army will not be left without the internet. There is also a Russian analogue of Starlink from Gazprom, but it is very much inferior in all characteristics and cannot be a full replacement. In addition, the Russians are trying to technically bypass the blocking of Russian terminals. It's hard to say how successful. The Russian side is also trying by all means to register its terminals in the Ukrainian "white lists."" Russian serviceman preparing a drone at a training ground in the Rostov region, October 24, 2025. Photo: Sergey Pivovarov / Sputnik / Scanpix / LETA. Communication problems, according to CIT analysts, increase the reaction time of commanders in units where the internet has not been established. At the lowest level (assault soldier - his commander), communication is almost always via radio, so there are no changes here. But when transmitting video from all UAVs to command posts or exchanging information between headquarters, broadband internet is crucial. Thus, in the absence of the internet or its low quality, commanders' situational awareness will decrease; they will not be able to understand in real time how the situation is unfolding in their section of the front, where the enemy is attacking, what orders need to be given, where forces should be deployed, what coordinates to provide to fire support assets. But in the end, all this will be done, just with a delay and not as effectively. Full control over troops and the battlefield will not disappear anywhere. CIT analysts do not directly link the slowdown in the Russian offensive to problems in the sphere of the internet. In January-February, according to our interlocutor, the Russian army traditionally takes an operational pause, preparing for the campaign that lasts from the end of March until the end of the year. So, the reduction in Russian attacks is primarily due to this. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, in turn, used local counterattacks throughout 2025 when the situation in a particular sector of the front was favorable for this (liquidation of the breakthrough near Dobropillya, clearing Kupyansk). "Probably, communication problems have added to the headaches of the Russian Armed Forces and did not allow them to act as effectively and promptly as if these problems did not exist," says the CIT analyst. "But this is definitely not a critical element in what is happening."

Russia’s Federal Security Service breaks off contact with Telegram founder Pavel Durov, accusing him of enabling terrorism and child exploitation

Russia’s Federal Security Service chief said Wednesday that talks with Telegram founder Pavel Durov had broken down. Speaking to Kremlin press pool reporter Alexander Yunashev, FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov accused the messaging platform of enabling crimes ranging from child exploitation to terrorism while Durov pursues personal financial gain.

Foreign access to Telegram correspondence, AI: statements by digital development minister

A bill to regulate artificial intelligence technology may be submitted to the lower house of parliament in the near future