Global Oil Inventories Deplete at Record Pace Amid Hormuz Disruption

Global oil stockpiles are draining at the fastest pace on record just as war and shipping disruption in the Middle East are constraining new supplies, leaving governments torn between military strategy and energy security.

Against the backdrop of US‑Israeli strikes on Iran and a partially choked Strait of Hormuz, officials and state‑aligned media now frame oil as both a weapon and a vulnerability, as inventories slide toward levels that experts say could strain the global system.

How fast are stocks falling?

All three government‑aligned reports draw on the same core data: an extraordinary drawdown in global oil inventories since early March.

Citing estimates from Morgan Stanley, they report that global oil stockpiles have been falling by about 4.8 million barrels per day between March 1 and April 25, a pace that “far exceeds” previous quarterly drawdown records tracked by the International Energy Agency (IEA).¹² Another assessment notes that “global visible oil stocks are already close to their lowest since 2018,” according to Goldman Sachs, underscoring how little spare buffer is left.³

Russian outlet RIA Novosti distills this into a stark headline: “Global oil reserves are depleting at a record pace,” attributing the surge in draws to “military actions by the US and Israel against Iran” that have disrupted fuel supplies from the Persian Gulf and “depleted the buffer that protects against supply shock.”¹

RT, which also cites Bloomberg and Morgan Stanley, stresses that the current rate of decline “surpasses previous inventory drawdown records” maintained by the IEA, branding it the fastest on record.² TASS uses similar language, saying “global oil reserves rapidly decline over the ongoing Middle East conflict and restrictions on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.”³

Despite minor differences in wording, the government‑aligned accounts converge on one core fact: inventories are falling unusually quickly by any historical standard.

Hormuz: A chokepoint under fire

Where the narratives begin to diverge is in how they apportion blame for the disruption—and what they emphasize about the Strait of Hormuz itself.

RT highlights Hormuz as a systemic weak spot: the waterway “normally carries about one‑fifth of the global oil and LNG trade,” making continued tanker disruption a global, not regional, problem.² Traffic “has remained heavily disrupted following the US‑Israeli military campaign against Iran and repeated accusations by both sides of violating a fragile ceasefire,” RT notes.²

TASS gives more attention to Iran’s countermoves. It says Tehran “decided to close the Strait of Hormuz to ships associated with the US, Israel and countries that backed the aggression against Iran,” directly tying Iran’s closure to the US‑Israeli operation launched on February 28.³ In this telling, the conflict is bidirectional: Western strikes on Iranian targets and Iranian controls on shipping both constrict flows.

RIA Novosti, meanwhile, focuses on the US‑Israeli side of the ledger and on Washington’s broader leverage. It reports that due to the conflict, “shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — a key route for oil and LNG exports from the Persian Gulf — has practically stopped.”¹ The outlet also underlines that the US “began a blockade of Iranian ports, promising to lift it only after a settlement is reached,” suggesting an escalating use of economic and maritime pressure alongside airstrikes.¹

Across the three, the contrast is clear: RT emphasizes the choke‑point’s global importance; TASS emphasizes Iran’s retaliatory closure and the failure to secure a lasting ceasefire; RIA stresses US and Israeli responsibility and the near‑halt in shipping.

From buffer to “operational stress”

Beyond the immediate disruption, all three accounts warn that what remains of global storage is sliding from comfort into danger.

RT relays a two‑stage warning from analysts: if current disruptions continue, commercial inventories could fall to “operational stress levels” by June and reach “operational floor” levels by September—“meaning stockpiles would approach the minimum volumes needed to keep pipelines, export terminals, and refineries functioning efficiently.”² At such levels, even routine hiccups can translate into physical shortages.

RIA Novosti frames the same dynamic more broadly, writing that the “rapid depletion of oil reserves increases the risk of even sharper price jumps and deficits” and that governments and industries will have “fewer opportunities to mitigate the consequences of the loss of more than a billion barrels of supplies” following the near‑closure of Hormuz.¹

TASS echoes this systemic concern, saying that the depletion “demonstrates a growing risk of even sharper price spikes and shortages, the consequences of which global governments will not be able to effectively mitigate.”³ It also warns that “sharp depletion” could lead to an “extremely unstable market situation even after the conflict in the Middle East ends,” suggesting that low inventories would leave the market fragile for months or years.³

Here, the perspectives largely align: buffers are thinning, and the risk is shifting from price volatility alone to physical scarcity and operational risk in the energy system itself.

US strategy: “Project Freedom” and domestic drawdowns

The outlets differ more sharply when they turn to US policy.

RT foregrounds Washington’s military posture, noting that President Donald Trump warned the US may revive and expand “Project Freedom,” a naval operation in the Strait of Hormuz, if no peace deal is reached with Iran.² Secretary of State Marco Rubio, RT adds, has stressed that “military options remain on the table if diplomacy fails,” underlining the threat of further escalation.²

At the same time, RT stresses that the US is not insulated from the fallout. Even as Trump claims the country “doesn’t need” the Strait of Hormuz, the US “still imports some crude oil from Persian Gulf producers.”² To offset global disruptions, Washington has “increased crude and fuel exports,” but this has required drawing down domestic inventories, which RT says have fallen to 11% below the five‑year seasonal average, citing US Energy Information Administration data.²

RIA Novosti and TASS do not dwell on US fuel statistics but focus instead on the political dimension of Washington’s decisions. RIA notes that the US and Iran agreed on a two‑week ceasefire in early April, followed by talks in Islamabad that “ended without result,” and that Washington later “unilaterally extended the truce” while simultaneously starting a blockade of Iranian ports.¹ TASS adds that Tehran “did not intend to recognize the unilateral extension” and would act “in line with its interests,” underscoring the breakdown of mutual trust.³

Together, these accounts depict a US government trying to project military dominance in a critical waterway while relying on increasingly tight domestic inventories at home—and facing a counterpart in Tehran that is both militarily and economically willing to push back.

Europe and the Russian energy dilemma

RT is the only one of the three that extends the analysis outward to Europe’s strategic energy choices. The outlet argues that the Gulf disruption has “reinforced the importance of Russian energy supplies despite a push by the EU to phase out imports of fossil fuels from the sanctioned country.”²

According to RT, “media reports” indicate that Brussels has delayed plans for a permanent ban on Russian oil “amid concerns that removing more crude from the market could tighten fuel supplies and push energy prices higher across the bloc.”² In this framing, the Hormuz crisis undercuts EU efforts to distance itself from Russian hydrocarbons, forcing a trade‑off between geopolitical sanctions policy and energy affordability.

Neither RIA Novosti nor TASS elaborate on European debates, though their emphasis on record‑low inventories implicitly supports the idea that any additional removal of supply—whether Iranian or Russian—could be dangerous in the short term.

Shared alarm, different angles

Across these government‑aligned perspectives, several points of convergence stand out:

All agree global oil inventories are falling at unprecedented speed, roughly 4.8 million barrels per day over nearly two months, and heading toward historically low levels.¹²³
All link the drawdown directly to the Middle East conflict and severe disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.
All warn of heightened risks of price spikes, shortages, and a structurally more fragile market, potentially persisting even after a ceasefire.

The contrasts lie in emphasis and attribution:

Responsibility: RIA focuses on US‑Israeli actions and port blockades; TASS spotlights Iran’s retaliatory closure of Hormuz; RT balances both but embeds them in a narrative about global system stress.
Policy framing: RT delves into US naval plans, domestic stockpiles, and EU reliance on Russian energy. RIA and TASS concentrate more on battlefield timelines, ceasefire politics, and the limits of diplomatic talks.
Strategic message: Russian‑aligned outlets implicitly argue that Western military escalation and sanctions policies have boomeranged into a global energy vulnerability, strengthening the strategic position of non‑Western suppliers like Russia.