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The lies about Chernobyl destroyed the USSR. What do people in a warring Ukraine think about it 40 years after the ChNPP disaster?

On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl disaster occurred. The liquidators of the accident at the ChNPP numbered between 600,000 and 800,000 people, with no precise records. There was a preference not to discuss the consequences, especially the long-term ones. The lies about Chernobyl ultimately blew up the USSR. At the same time, the Ukrainian Green Party, born at the peak of public interest in ecology, never grew into the country's main political force. The correspondent for 'Novaya-Evropa' in Ukraine, Olga Musafirova, has been writing about Chernobyl since the 1990s. On the eve of the 40th anniversary, she met with an accident liquidator who discusses why the Russian army occupied the Chernobyl exclusion zone in 2022; a politician who was at the forefront of the Ukrainian green movement and hints at the 'man-made' nature of the reactor explosion; and recalls the fate of a scientist, the hero of her 1990s publication, who collected a menagerie of mutant animals after the accident and whose scientific work proved useless in modern Ukraine. The worldview of the characters in this text, who survived the terrible catastrophe, reveals traces of conspiracy theories. Their stories reflect the dramatic path of a country struggling to emerge from Chernobyl for 40 years. A monument to Prometheus, erected during the construction of the Chernobyl NPP, against the backdrop of the station's industrial site, Ukraine, April 9, 2026. Photo: Genya Savilov / AFP / Scanpix / LETA. Liquidator and deputy of the first convocation of the Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr Usatenko. Photo: Olga Musafirova / 'Novaya Gazeta Yevropa'. Liquidator For four decades, the closed, guarded space of the Chernobyl exclusion zone has attracted thrill-seekers – stalkers, commercial tourists, and looters alike. Already on the first day of the full-scale war, Russian occupiers burst into it. The personnel servicing the decommissioned station found themselves hostages, spending 600 hours on shift under the muzzles of automatic weapons instead of the standard 12. Russian troops searched not only the immediate territory of the nuclear facility but the entire Zone. The occupation of the Chernobyl zone lasted just over a month, after which the Russian army left it. — I am convinced that they were tasked with finding evidence that Ukraine was preparing a 'dirty bomb' in Chernobyl, — claims Volodymyr Usatenko. — Why dig trenches in the Red Forest? Who were they defending against if there were no people around at all? I meet with Volodymyr Ivanovych in Kyiv in April 2026; my interlocutor is 77 years old. We talk in the office of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine on Khreshchatyk. Usatenko has an explanation why the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant with its dangerous RBMK reactors was not shut down until 2000: the construction of the 'Shelter' facility over the fourth unit became a perfect umbrella for national and international corruption. Funds allocated for the sarcophagus disappeared into the abyss without a trace. But attempts at investigation were met with promises of further bad news from the station. Now, they say, the old structure will collapse, and what happened in 1986 will be repeated! — Angela Merkel, from 1994 to 1998, served as Federal Minister for the Environment [Nature Conservation and Nuclear Reactor Safety] in Helmut Kohl's government, — Usatenko recalls. — And, of course, she knew that after the explosion, Germany's territory was also heavily contaminated by decaying Chernobyl radioactive materials. The Germans approached Moscow: let's sort this out, the accident happened during the USSR, decisions were made in the Kremlin. Moscow replied: 'We are aware of the situation. We propose to discuss and resolve the problems without an international scandal.' The plan was: Russia would settle the issue with Germany, and German specialists would help Ukraine. They would make efforts to talk about it less in the world! And they also wanted to get the Germans to influence the IAEA and WHO, suggesting that nothing fatal had happened to Ukraine. Volodymyr Usatenko ironically remarks: — Then experts came to Kyiv from Berlin with fancy pens, fancy dosimeters, measured everything, and concluded: 'We are dealing with radio-phobia! Chernobyl's problems are practically resolved. Except for the truly psychotropic influence of panic rumors.' Subsequently, as a parliamentarian, he often received confirmation from Bundestag deputies with whom he communicated: the secrets of Chernobyl were guarded by the Kremlin. Contrary to official data and the IAEA's position (before the accident, the reactor contained about 180–190 tons of nuclear fuel, and after the explosion, about 95% remained, with only 3–5% released into the atmosphere), Usatenko insisted and continues to insist: less than one percent of the fuel remained in the reactor after the explosion – 1.8 tons out of 190, with about 20% scattered across the station. The main content, however, went into the environment. The IAEA, according to him, influenced the viewpoint of the then-leadership of Ukraine so that the world would not panic and abandon nuclear energy altogether. He also has a special opinion regarding the Chernobyl zone: — There are about a thousand localization sites for radioactive waste in this territory. What was the administration of the Zone created for, mainly? To get a map: where exactly radioactive waste is buried, in what quantity, and what its activity is. They supposedly made maps. After some time, as a commission consultant and expert, I inquired, wanting to see them. 'Oh, we lost them,' they told me. Over time, lush vegetation covered everything… Liquidators prepare to enter an area of extremely high radiation near the destroyed fourth reactor of the Chernobyl NPP, helping each other put on protective suits made of lead and rubber, May 1986. Photo: Novosti / Sipa / Scanpix / LETA. Scientist Journalists write more intensely about the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster on the eve of another anniversary, especially round dates. However, in the first decade, such publications appeared much more frequently. In March 1995, I traveled on assignment to Zhytomyr to meet Professor Viacheslav Konovalov, who had recently been the Vice-Rector for Science at the local agricultural institute. Konovalov had already started working at a new place, at the Institute of Animal Breeding and Genetics of the National Academy of Agrarian Sciences of Ukraine, located in the village of Chubynske near Kyiv. As for Zhytomyr, where he moved after Chernobyl by his own scientific volition, calling it 'like a dacha' in his words, and where he spent eight years, he was saying goodbye and completing his affairs. (Some districts of Zhytomyr Oblast are still considered among the most unfavorable after the ChNPP explosion.) Biology Professor Viacheslav Konovalov in his laboratory in Zhytomyr demonstrates a stuffed foal with mutations, March 11, 1996. Photo: Efrem Lukatsky / AP / Scanpix / LETA. That period severely strained his nerves. 'As a result, at the genetics department, Viacheslav Sergeevich was given a symbolic quarter-time position. The management cited several reasons. Although the real reason, stated verbally, was: 'Unhealthy interest in Chernobyl mutations.' A classic altruist and an enthusiastic researcher, Konovalov cared little about the daily bread for his family. But he feared for his collection, which he called the 'Museum of the Chernobyl Warning,' and for his other brainchild – the Laboratory of Engineering Biological Problems and New Technologies. The Zhytomyr Engineering Technological Institute provided a home for the laboratory. The museum situation was worse. Rats devoured two mutant calves in the basement, despite the formalin. Some exhibits had to be moved home: an unpleasant, to say the least, neighbor and a bad omen. The eight-legged foal was placed with his daughter, in a box on the balcony of their Kyiv apartment. Some items remained on display in his former office. And the rest, Viacheslav Sergeevich, placed in glass containers, preserved with formalin, conserved, and... buried in the garden. He buried them for better times, he explained to me. View of the destroyed fourth power unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant after the disaster, Ukraine, April 26, 1986. Photo: Novosti / Sipa / Scanpix / LETA. The photographer who came with me 'to capture the horror' had little to do. And the professor was irritated: the press only wanted to speculate! He covered his tracks, telling other journalists that he had buried his findings in the forests, near the farms where he found them, and marked the locations on a map. He feared they would be destroyed. Post-Chernobyl public education, including shock therapy, impossible in Soviet times and implemented at the very beginning of independence, was again labeled 'pseudo.' The birth of mutant animals in radiation-contaminated areas could lead to a connection with the disaster. I was not the first to write about Konovalov. In 1992, the professor became one of the heroes of the 23-minute documentary film 'We Are Still Alive…' by Georgiy Shklyarevsky. Gray-haired, imposing, in a white coat and rubber gloves, Viacheslav Sergeevich shows one exhibit after another to the camera (all this takes place in the Zhytomyr Regional Veterinary Laboratory in the presence of colleagues) and concludes: 'Thus, the environment affects cellular differentiation.' I decided to find out how modern scientists view his work. Denys Vishnevsky, head of the scientific department of the Chernobyl Radiation and Ecological Biosphere Reserve, has been in the Zone since 2000. He writes engagingly about biodiversity and helps film crews capture herds of Przewalski's horses, deer, and even unruly wild cows during peak visitor season. He trolls on his Facebook page those who try to see one eight-legged moose instead of two in a camera trap photo. And with the humor typical of Zone inhabitants, he posts an Easter card: against the backdrop of the sarcophagus chimney and a trefoil, 'Radiation!' is written on a basket with a candle and a dosimeter, and next to it, a rabbit with phosphorescent eyes… Head of the Scientific Department of the Chernobyl Radiation and Ecological Biosphere Reserve, Denys Vishnevsky, releases a beaver into the forest in the exclusion zone, Ukraine, April 13, 2021. Photo: Evgeniy Maloletka / AP / Scanpix / LETA. I asked Denys Vishnevsky what he thought about the value of Professor Konovalov's efforts. — There's a thing called hyperdiagnosis. In animal complexes, defective animals are sometimes born, and they are simply disposed of, — answered Vishnevsky. — But then Chernobyl happens. A professor arrives, and what was discarded begins to be collected, exhibited, and the fact of pathogenesis is highlighted. Of course, it's great that a screening was done, even by partisan methods. Yes, radiation works. But not that pronouncedly! Our scientists have not encountered such a level of genetic anomalies since then. Denys also noted: — Radiation has a tendency to inspire ontological fear, the fear of a curse. Something invisible that will lead to your premature death or strike your descendants. That's why people readily accept and pay attention to such information. — I am not familiar with Professor Konovalov's scientific articles. An old newspaper publication is not enough, — responded Yevhen Turenko, Candidate of Biological Sciences, senior researcher at the Department of Radiobiology and Radioecology of the Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, to a similar request. However, he indicated that the problem of assessing the medical consequences of Chernobyl is complicated by the fact that this issue is also social and political – it was like that during the Soviet era, and it is like that now during independence: — If Ukrainian doctors point out that radiation is unequivocally bad, harmful, then the international community denies much of it. And points precisely to a lack of scientific evidence. Empty containers for storing spent nuclear fuel in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, September 2022. Photo: Leo211 / Wikimedia (CC BY-SA 4.0). According to Yevhen Turenko, only the link between thyroid cancer and the consequences of the disaster is not disputed. There are certain disagreements regarding leukemias. „ — Everything else is interpreted by Ukrainian doctors as the influence of radiation in general. While foreign scientists say the cause is stress, 'tied' to resettlement from contaminated territories, and the screening effect, — Turenko continued. — If you are looking for some pathology, you will find it, because it wasn't looked for before. The same applies to Konovalov's research, in my opinion. After all, before the accident, such work was not conducted in these areas, right? What does the presence of a certain number of mutated specimens mean from a scientific point of view? Nothing. There are no comparisons. I sent emails to Professor Viktor Kunakh, President of the Ukrainian Society of Geneticists and Breeders, as Konovalov was on his council and headed the Kyiv regional organization of the society, and to Professor Ostap Zhukorsky, Director of the Institute of Animal Breeding and Genetics, where Konovalov worked for many years. I found obituaries from ten years ago listing the scientist's achievements and mentioning that very collection of mutants. Unfortunately, neither Professor Kunakh, nor Professor Zhukorsky, nor their staff knew anything about the fate of the 'Museum of the Chernobyl Warning.' Radiation warning sign in the territory of the temporary localization site of radioactive waste 'Red Forest' in Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine, April 14, 2026. Photo: Kyrylo Chubotin / Ukrinform / Sipa / Scanpix / LETA. Politician Co-founder of the Green Party of Ukraine (GPU), its 'face,' deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the third convocation, Vitaliy Kononov, suggests recording an interview in a coffee shop. There have been no elections in the country for a long time, and paying rent for the party office is expensive. — Chernobyl itself became the destroyer, the destroyer of the Union, a state that was 'held' by the communists, — he states. — At that moment, the struggle for power between the KGB and the Central Committee of the CPSU intensified to the limit. Chernobyl ultimately blew up Gorbachev too, if one can put it that way. The first thirty-six hours, critical, the most important ones, were missed. No evacuation from Pripyat, no public notification, no adequate medical response. By and large, we still don't know why it exploded. I talked a lot with Bryukhanov (Director of ChNPP in 1970–1986 - Ed.). We held a press conference together. He also had no idea, admitting guilt only partially. As the state commission established, a complex of reasons influenced it: design flaws of the RBMK reactor, human factors, an experiment. The USSR concentrated all information, valuable materials ended up in Moscow. Ukraine and even more so Belarus inherited the consequences of the disaster. Chernobyl is now forty years old, and nuclear Russia is at war with Ukraine; the principle has not changed. We return to the conversation about the 1990s, when sociologists predicted almost forty percent support for the Ukrainian greens. True, mandates in parliament under the banner of environmental protection were taken by much more organized national democrats, who immediately cooled down to 'their not-so-important' issue. Moreover, Ukraine had a chance to get its first president from the Minister of Environmental Protection, Yuriy Shcherbak, a former epidemiologist, Doctor of Medical Sciences, writer, author of the documentary novel 'Chernobyl.' Kononov headed Shcherbak's election headquarters. He still feels guilty about what happened: — Yuriy Nikolaevich refused to use the ministry's administrative resources. We had no experience, the party had just been created, not yet registered. We invited students to collect signatures to nominate the candidate. And then they slipped us 'dead souls.' When the situation came to light, Shcherbak did not seek a way out but said: 'That's it, we're ending the campaign.' Although a politician with his intellect, principles, passion, and diplomatic talent combined would have been the very European choice for Ukraine. The majority would have voted for him: after all, he's a person against radiation! Not the party apparatchik Kravchuk, and not the nationalistic 'Rukh' member Chornovil, who was still viewed with prejudice in 1991. Co-founder of the Green Party of Ukraine, Vitaliy Kononov. Photo: Olga Musafirova / 'Novaya Gazeta Yevropa'. — Conditional mood? My interlocutor recalls the context: — At that time, citizens demanded not only regular information about radioactivity but also about the nitrate content in beets in grocery stores. But this was the environmental consciousness of Soviet people released into freedom. Kononov was elected to the Verkhovna Rada in 1998, when the greens' rating had dropped to seven percent, but it was enough to overcome the barrier. His signature black jacket, hair tied in a ponytail, bicycle as a means of transport. Protests against the 'Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2030,' which envisioned the construction of new nuclear power units and opposition to the appearance of nuclear waste dumps in the country. Accusations of lobbying for the business interests of sponsors, criticism: 'They arrived on bicycles – they left in Mercedes!', internal strife. Pro-Russian one-day political projects that pushed the greens out of the electoral field. The GPU never made it back to parliament. — And now Zelensky's supporters are generally called 'greens,' — Vitaliy laughs. Kyiv

Chernobyl documentary: RT speaks to liquidators and survivors 40 years on

RT’s Chernobyl: A Lesson for Humanity revisits the 1986 nuclear disaster through the memories of liquidators, doctors, scientists and evacuees

"The only protection we had were iodine tablets." Former Latvian President Valdis Zatlers was a liquidator 40 years ago. He told hromadske about Chernobyl, health consequences, and the nuclear threat today

On the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl NPP accident, the Ukrainian publication hromadske spoke with former liquidator and ex-President of Latvia Valdis Zatlers. In 1986, while working as a trauma surgeon in a Riga hospital, he served in the zone as a senior lieutenant of the medical service. "I, along with other medics from our unit, pushed for personal dosimeters to be issued to personnel. We finally got them, but they were non-functional. Neither I nor my fellow servicemen ever found out how much radiation we received in Chernobyl," recalls Zatlers. Two months later, he returned to Riga with negative changes in his blood count, and one indicator, according to him, did not normalize even after decades. Zatlers told hromadske how this experience influenced his views on nuclear weapons, how he assesses the threat of attacks on nuclear power plants, and what, in his opinion, depends on Ukraine's and Europe's security today. Valdis Zatlers. Photo: Paula Čurkste / LETA. Editorial Note: The interview was published on the hromadske website. With the permission of our colleagues, we are publishing its full translation, with minor editorial changes. Drank perfume against radiation - Mr. President, how did you become a liquidator? - The military enlistment office informed me about the call-up of reservists for two months for military retraining at a training ground. By the way, I was lucky that on May 8, 1986, I, like others, was not taken directly from work because I was in the operating room. In the evening, I arrived at the military enlistment office, and on May 9, we were put on a train, and the next day we were already in the 30-kilometer Chernobyl zone. We were a regiment - 700 servicemen. Soon, reservists from Estonia camped near us. We even said among ourselves that the Soviet authorities were thus organizing genocide against Latvians and Estonians. - What did you know about the scale of the accident upon arrival in the zone? - I knew about the accident before our train departed – information was leaking into Latvia from Sweden. After all, the Swedes registered an increased radiation level and determined that the cloud from the Chernobyl NPP had reached them, including through Latvia. And when we were loading onto the train, I understood that we were being taken to Chernobyl – where else could we have been taken in this situation? - Were you given any protective equipment for the journey? - We, the medical service officers, tried to recall everything we knew about radiation from our institute while on the train to give adequate advice to others. But the only protection we had was iodine tablets in our individual first-aid kits. And that was very good, they really saved us, because in the first month after the accident, the level of radioactive iodine was catastrophically high. After a month, the iodine began to decay, and its negative impact on the body significantly decreased. - How did you settle in the zone and what did you do as a liquidator? - The first night we slept on the ground, in a clearing in the forest. Then, right on the border of the 30-kilometer zone, we built a camp for ourselves. And we only went into the zone to work. Obviously, neither our commanders nor the authorities understood what and how we should do. The USSR was not prepared for a nuclear power plant accident. Sometimes it even seemed that we were just being loaded with something so that we wouldn't sit idle. For example, in two months, we rebuilt the camp three times. In general, our job was to shovel the 2-4 cm top layer of radioactive soil. It was then transported somewhere. We dug up the earth with shovels, the wind raised radioactive dust, and it settled on the soil and on us again. There was also work on decontaminating transport leaving the zone. The vehicles were washed with some aerosols. And the pits where the used water was discharged were nearby. And the people who carried out the decontamination received very high radiation doses. - What protective equipment did you have? - We were given respirators, which became unusable after a day or two because they were clogged with dust. After a week, we were given chemical protection suits, which were impregnated with some chemical substance. It was incredibly hot, and the body in these suits developed rashes. And no one gave us any instructions on how to reduce our individual radiation dose. As a senior lieutenant, I had nine subordinates. I advised them not to eat or drink anything other than what the kitchen provided. June-July, there were plenty of berries in the forest, I explained that berries absorb radiation, that they are dangerous. But it was very difficult to convince people not to eat them, not to take off their respirators and surgical masks. Our main protection was moonshine from nearby villages – after we drank all the alcohol from the medical unit. We quickly bought all the cologne and perfume in the nearest store. We drank "Lily of the Valley." Alcohol relaxed us, and we also perceived it as a prevention against various diseases. Only one bath in two months in the zone - After work, did you wash before entering your tent? - In two months of work in the zone, I bathed only once – there was no opportunity more often. Water was brought to us from somewhere – I don't know how radiation-free it was. We returned from the zone and entered the camp, our tents, in the same clothes and shoes we worked in. In two months in the zone, our uniforms were never changed. You could bring a microscopic piece of graphite on the sole, and it would multiply the radiation level in the tent several times. We wiped our shoes of dust with some rags, grass, but we threw these scraps here, in the camp, what else could be done with them? A general view of the Chernobyl NPP after the disaster, Ukraine, October 1, 1986. Photo: EPA. - Did the political instructors tell you about the consequences of the accident for the country? - For the first time, we were in absolute informational isolation. A television was placed for us about a month later. We could write home, but not all letters reached their destination. We ran to nearby villages to call home, to talk to people, but commanders punished us for it. Our political instructors said nothing about the accident. Instead, they promised us a paradise life upon our return home – a vacation in Sochi, payments, housing. They even manipulated these promises. For example, they said that people who accumulated a certain level of radiation would be sent home immediately. People went to do very dirty work, received high doses of radiation, and no one let them go because no one measured their individual doses. - Were you forced to stay in the zone longer? - When we were called up, they said it was for two months. In the zone, they explained to us that we were here for six months. At the same time, our command changed approximately every three weeks. But we very rudely, with physical threats, told our commanders that we would not stay. And they allowed us to return after two months. By the way, they didn't even change our clothes before sending us home, they didn't wash us – they put us on a military plane and delivered us to Latvia with all our radiation. I told my comrades then to go home even naked, but not to bring radiation home to their families. I, for example, first washed in a Finnish bath, changed into clothes I had just bought in a store, and then went to my parents. And I simply threw my Chernobyl uniform in the trash. - What was written in your military documents about your service as a liquidator and the radiation dose received? - My documents state that I was on military training for 60 days. And I received the official status of a liquidator of the Chernobyl accident only later. - After returning home, did anyone inquire about your health? - Many scientists spoke with me, who knew only the theory of nuclear power plant accidents. We, the liquidators, knew more than them. As for my health, I, a surgeon with an inherently strong nervous system, developed a nervous twitch of my eyelids, trembling in my hands, and blood problems. I treated the latter with folk remedies – red wine. At that time, there was an anti-alcohol campaign in the USSR, and my grandmother had to stand in long queues to buy one or two bottles of wine for me. Although there was no exact proof then, and there is none now, that it helps to increase, for example, leukocyte levels. - How many Latvians became liquidators? - I think about three to four thousand. For a small country, this is a significant number. We meet every year. We have a monument to Chernobyl victims, Chernobyl pensions, and corresponding benefits. A memorial stone dedicated to the victims of the Chernobyl tragedy on the grounds of Riga Clinical University Hospital, Latvia, April 26, 2017. Photo: Zane Bitere / LETA. By the way, when in 2010, as President of Latvia, I met with the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, I brought up Chernobyl issues. His position shocked me. The Russian President replied that the consequences of Chernobyl are Ukraine's problem, and Ukraine should deal with it. - Have you been to the Chernobyl zone after 1986? - Yes, twice. The first time as President of Latvia, by the way, the only president who visited the zone. I wanted to show Latvia's solidarity with Ukraine. Because the USSR brewed the Chernobyl mess, and Ukraine had to deal with the problems on its own. But I was constantly prevented from walking where I wanted – they were protecting the president. I asked a guard to show me his radiometer – funny readings, nothing serious, but everyone present was worried anyway. And then I visited the zone for the 30th anniversary of the accident as a participant in a Chernobyl conference. And I moved around more freely there. - In your opinion, how real is the threat of a Russian strike on Ukrainian nuclear power plants today? - Such a strike is a nuclear catastrophe. Overcoming its consequences could take decades – the Chernobyl accident showed this. And the victims of such strikes will not only be Ukrainians – Russians too, as they will not be able to prevent the spread of radiation towards their country. This should deter them. - By this logic, will Russians never use nuclear weapons? - Thanks to Chernobyl, I realized that nuclear weapons have no use on the battlefield. They are for deterrence and intimidation of the enemy. No one can predict which territory will be contaminated after an atomic bomb. And Russians cannot predict whether they themselves will suffer from it. Against Russia? So, a Russophobe - In 1986, the Soviet authorities concealed the scale of the Chernobyl disaster from citizens. Similarly, in late 2021 – early 2022, the Ukrainian authorities reassured citizens about the threat of a Russian invasion. You, a person who was a liquidator and head of state, understand the motives of the authorities? - In April 1986, the authorities truly did not know or comprehend the scale and consequences of the catastrophe, because it was the first accident. At that time, it was about the ignorance of the Soviet leadership. As for the start of the full-scale war in 2022, you understand, President Zelensky did not want to scare citizens. Because panic could have very much weakened Ukrainians. On the other hand, your (Ukrainian. – Ed.) president, like Europe, still had hope to somehow calm the Russians. At the end of 2021, I was at a closed conference in Great Britain, where they were discussing this very thing – the possibility of finding common ground with the Russians. - Did you personally believe in a dove of peace? - No, I said there would be a war. And that it would be in February – Russians like their February 23rd. By the way, it was in February, just before the start of the war, that Latvia supplied Ukraine with weapons: Stingers, Javelins – everything we had. - Wasn't Latvia afraid of being left without weapons – after all, Russia is nearby? - The map with the disposition of Russian troops showed that there was no threat to Latvia at that moment, but there was a real threat to Ukraine. - Today, Russian drones fly into Latvia's airspace. What reaction to them do you consider optimal for your country? - And what reaction would you like to see? That we declare war on Russia? Unfortunately, there is a war going on next door, and isolated drones from both sides accidentally fall in the Baltics, Poland, Romania. When 20 drones immediately flew into Poland, it was no longer an accident. If such a situation occurs in Latvia, we will shoot down these drones – with the help of Ukrainians (laughs). - Russia explained its invasion of Ukraine by its desire to prevent our accession to NATO. Why, then, did it not start aggression against Latvia, which became a member of NATO in 2004? - Because Ukraine's membership in NATO is just a pretext for war. The reason is to prevent Ukraine from following the European path of development, adopting European values, and breaking free from Russia's influence. - And how did Latvia manage to break free from Russia's influence in 2004? - We realized back then that our statehood and security completely depended on whether we would break free from Russia. And we made appropriate efforts. For example, to join the European Union, we adopted over 250 laws in a year to harmonize our legislation with European law. In addition, it was a time when NATO and the EU were developing cooperation with former USSR countries. Russia was also considering joining NATO and the EU at that time. And we were able to take advantage of this window of opportunity. Latvian President Valdis Zatlers, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, and Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves at the Freedom Monument in Riga, Latvia, November 18, 2008. Photo: Inga Kundzina / EPA. - You were the President of Latvia when, at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Ukraine was denied prospects of joining the Alliance. Why weren't we accepted then? - At the Bucharest Summit (NATO Summit in April 2008. – Ed.), Latvia, Poland, and Romania supported the idea of Ukraine joining NATO. But it was considered that Ukraine was not yet ready for membership in the Alliance. The Russians dominated that summit. Unfortunately, no one in the West took Putin's speeches at the time seriously, which spoke of a redistribution of the world on Russian terms. And a few months later, in August 2008, Russia attacked Georgia. But then the West did not understand who they were dealing with. - Why did Europe keep convincing itself that Russia posed no threat? - Perhaps because everyone in Europe was accustomed to peace, Europeans did not think in terms of narratives that someone could attack someone. They thought in terms of collective security, collective defense, guarantees of NATO membership. And when countries like Latvia, Poland, and Estonia spoke about the Russian threat, we were called Russophobes. NATO – and without the US NATO - Now, when the US is undermining NATO, are you sure that NATO membership is still a guarantee of security for Ukraine? - America's position will not destroy NATO. The US is an important player in NATO, but only one of many. Every NATO member can behave... strangely, but because of this, NATO will not fall apart. Do not forget that most of its members are European countries, for whom NATO's eastward expansion has brought stability and prosperity. - Periodically, the question arises in Ukraine about creating a new security alliance in Eastern Europe, of which Ukraine would become a member. For example, it could include the Baltic states, Scandinavia, and Poland. What is your opinion on such prospects? - Why create some alternative to NATO and disperse forces when NATO, a successful security organization, already exists? Ukraine is not yet admitted to NATO. But Ukraine now has the most modern army in Europe. And it is a big mistake to keep Ukraine outside of NATO. For Ukraine, there is no other path than NATO, and for NATO, there is no other path than to accept Ukraine. There are no other security guarantees except military ones. And this is NATO membership. Because throughout the history of the Alliance, no one has attacked its members precisely because it concerns their collective security. This is not blackmail: NATO in exchange for territories - What do you think about the possibility of NATO troops participating in the war with Russia on Ukraine's side? - A good question. But participation – when? I think this is only possible after Ukraine becomes a member of NATO. - But, according to NATO's charter, a country at war cannot become a member. - Because everything must happen gradually. A ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine occurs on the line of contact. Negotiations take place, which end the war. Ukraine joins NATO and the EU within the territories it will control. A protest against Russia's military invasion of Ukraine outside the Russian embassy in Riga, Latvia, February 24, 2022. Photo: Toms Kalnins / EPA. - But this is forcing Ukraine to abandon its legitimate territory, a kind of blackmail. - This is not blackmail. This is a real way out. It is not about you forever abandoning your territories that are currently occupied by Russia. It is about free territories coming under NATO protection. And you can regain the currently occupied territories later. It will be a long process. Latvia, for example, was occupied by the Soviet Union for 50 years. Few believed that we would restore our statehood. And your situation is better than ours: you have preserved your statehood and a large part of your territories. - But in 2007, you had to permanently cede part of Latvia – the Abrene district – to Russia. - A country to which other countries have no territorial claims can become a NATO member. Therefore, we abandoned disputes with Russia regarding Abrene, which began back in the 1920s. Now this territory is part of Russia's Pskov region. The majority of its population has always been Russians; it is realistically the Russian hinterland. We decided that the game was not worth the candle and eliminated any reason for territorial disputes. By the way, Germany was putting a lot of pressure on us then to make this decision. - Is it naive to think that Russia, after a ceasefire, will not make territorial claims on us? Moreover, it considers the occupied territories of Ukraine to be part of Russia, even included it in its constitution, resettled people from its hinterland there, essentially colonized them. In such conditions, Ukraine may not have enough 50 years to regain these territories. - Any situation is not forever. I repeat: you have preserved your statehood. Russia took parts of territories from you, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Finland. But Ukraine can become so strong in the territory it controls that it can regain the currently occupied lands – I do not rule this out. It is already very powerful militarily, it has a developed civil society. Triangle Ukraine – Europe – Russia - Why do you think peace negotiations between Ukraine, the US, and Russia cannot break the deadlock? - Firstly, they are not being conducted by specialists on the American side: President Trump turned negotiations into his family business. Secondly, these negotiations should be conducted in a new format: Ukraine – Europe – Russia. At some point, Europe relied too heavily on America in these negotiations and gave her the initiative. This initiative needs to be returned. This requires bold and decisive European leaders. Perhaps the Chancellor of Germany [Friedrich Merz] will manage to rise to the required level. However, it is difficult to conduct negotiations when Putin really does not want them. Stylized image of Vladimir Putin outside the Russian embassy in Riga, Latvia, January 24, 2023. Photo: Toms Kalnins / EPA. In my opinion, Europe made its biggest mistake in 2022-2023, at the beginning of the war. At that time, Ukraine had the military initiative, and then Europe should have given you all the weapons, without restrictions, without conditions or discussions, simply given them so that you could develop your initiative. Europe did not do this because it was afraid of conflict with Russia. Europe was late in solving the problem with lesser means. The war has escalated. By the way, I think another mistake of Europe was the policy of ignoring Putin after the start of the full-scale war. Because you should always leave room for dialogue, quality communication channels. - Europe is still not very bold, let's be honest. In your opinion, how can Ukraine draw Europe into more decisive action? - You must become good partners for every European country. Find common ground with your neighbors so as not to have Russia to the east and Hungary and Slovakia to the west. And resolve issues with European countries quietly and calmly. - Do you, even for a moment, consider the possibility that Russia might attack the European Union? - I can't imagine that. But every threat from Russia must be taken seriously and prepared to counter it. So that the "little green men" do not repeat themselves. I think if in 2014 in Crimea Ukrainians had offered armed resistance, Russia would have stopped. It was not prepared for it. And so, first Ukraine missed the moment, and then – Europe. But this can be understood: everyone hoped until the last that they would not have to fight. - Mr. President, in your opinion, how will the situation in the Ukraine – Europe – Russia triangle develop in 2026? - A very difficult question. Russia perceives all attempts to find common ground as weakness. What can be offered to it? In Anchorage, Donald Trump offered Putin a war-ending option that would help Russia save face. Putin did not accept it because he did not need it. I think as long as Putin's inner circle agrees to fight, the war will continue. We need to ensure that Putin can no longer fight. What that might be – I don't know. Although I think about it all the time. Author: Maya Orel

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