Cuba is experiencing its most severe economic crisis since the 1959 revolution and is on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe. All the island's long-standing problems have been exacerbated many times over due to the oil blockade imposed by the Donald Trump administration, which has been met with "resolute condemnation" from Russia, a long-time ally of Cuba. President Trump claims that Washington is in contact with Havana and is offering a deal. The exact nature of this deal is unknown, but the Trump administration emphasizes the need for political liberalization and radical economic reforms, which would naturally benefit not only Cubans but also the US authorities. Talk is also intensifying about who could become "their man in Havana." Western media points to two people with the surname Castro among others. This article from "Novaya Gazeta Europe" discusses the situation on the island and the options available to the Cuban government. A mural depicting Che Guevara in Havana, Cuba, February 17, 2026. Photo: Ramon Espinosa / AP / Scanpix / LETA. No Longer Exporting In the past two weeks, Russian airline planes have been flying to Cuba empty: these were evacuation flights to help tourists leave the island. Rossiya Airlines (part of Aeroflot) operated such flights from Havana and Varadero to Moscow, and Nordwind from Varadero, Holguin, and Cayo Coco. The last announced flights took place on February 21: Holguin - Moscow (Nordwind) and Varadero - Moscow (Rossiya). The reason was a severe shortage of aviation fuel in Cuba due to the oil blockade imposed by the Donald Trump administration. The republic's aviation authorities issued a notice stating that Jet A-1 aviation fuel would not be available at the country's airports from February 10 to March 11. However, it is possible that the issue will not be resolved within a month. The situation has affected not only Russian airlines. For example, Air Canada and other Canadian carriers – WestJet and Air Transat – have announced the suspension of flights. However, Mexican Aeroméxico has continued its flights: the route is significantly shorter, allowing aircraft to carry enough fuel for the return trip. Meanwhile, Spanish carriers Iberia, Air Europa, and World2Fly have changed their routes: their planes now make technical stops in the Dominican Republic for refueling. Turkish Airlines now flies from Istanbul with a stopover in Cancun. Rossiya and Nordwind do not have this option: refueling their aircraft carries the risk of secondary sanctions from Washington. The Cuban leadership is unconcerned about this aspect, but fuel suppliers in the Dominican Republic and Mexico will not take the risk. Russian tourists in line to check in luggage for Rossiya Airlines before departing from Havana Airport, Cuba, February 16, 2026. Photo: Yamil Lage / AFP / Scanpix / LETA. Crisis Turning into Catastrophe What is happening is a severe blow to the tourism industry, one of Cuba's most important sources of foreign currency. Even without Trump, tourist flow to Cuba had been declining for years. For example, in 2025, the country was visited by 2.6 million tourists (an 18% drop from the previous year) – the lowest figure since 2002. For comparison, in 2018 and 2019, the numbers were 4.6 million and 4.2 million people, respectively. This was largely a consequence of the US-Cuban thaw that began after then-US President Barack Obama's visit to the island in 2016. The largest number of tourists in 2025 were from Canada – 754,000 (-12.4% year-on-year), followed by Russians – 131,900 (-29%). Therefore, the absence of flights from these two countries could be fatal for the Cuban tourism industry, on which the government had placed a special emphasis in recent years. Havana believed that tourism would save the collapsing economy and prioritized accordingly. For example, in 2024, 37.4% of state investments were directed towards tourism and the hotel sector – 11 times more than allocated to education and healthcare. Now, hotels stand empty, and healthcare and education are in evident decline. "The crisis, which has been building up over the past few years, has affected all Cubans without exception. The fuel shortage and the dilapidated infrastructure (many thermal power plants have long been out of order) have led to an energy collapse. During peak hours, more than 60% of the country remains without electricity. Sometimes, rolling blackouts last up to 20 hours a day in the provinces and 12-14 hours in Havana. The energy crisis has triggered a chain reaction in life support systems. Due to the lack of electricity and fuel for pumping stations, hundreds of thousands of Cubans are without water supply. The absence of gasoline for garbage trucks has led to a sanitary crisis: mountains of waste are accumulating on the streets of cities, which were already far from clean standards, creating an ideal environment for epidemics in a tropical climate. A queue of cars at a gas station in Havana, Cuba, January 30, 2026. Photo: Adalberto Roque / AFP / Scanpix / LETA. In late 2025, authorities acknowledged an increase in arboviral infections (caused by viruses transmitted by mosquitoes, ticks, and midges) – dengue, Zika, and chikungunya. Another alarming indicator is infant mortality. Last year, it was 9.8 per 1,000 live births. This is significantly higher than the 2024 figure (7 per 1,000) and comparable to the early 1990s (in 1992, 10.2 infants died per 1,000 live births on the island). It is already clear that the current year will be even more deadly. In the absence of gasoline, ambulances cannot respond to calls. Hospitals, which have long had a shortage of basic medicines, have suspended non-urgent surgeries. Sometimes, surgeons operate under the light of phone flashlights. According to Cuban state media, there is sometimes not even enough gasoline for hearses, preventing timely burials. Government institutions and companies have switched to a shortened workweek. School hours are reduced, and universities have switched students to distance learning or flexible attendance. Cultural life has been put on hold: mass events, including the world-famous book and cigar fairs, have been canceled. Bus services within and between cities have been reduced to a minimum. Prices for services from private taxi drivers who manage to get fuel have soared to levels unaffordable for the vast majority of Cubans. Food security has also been undermined. "The state rationing system for basic products (rice, flour, beans, etc.) no longer guarantees even the physiological minimum: rations have been cut, and supplies are irregular. "There is no longer bread or milk for children at the ration store – at least bread so my children can go to school," complained a local resident on February 16 in a Facebook group for the city of Matanzas. "I'm not one of those mothers who says things like this, but if the Americans are going to interfere in the affairs of this country, let them interfere, because it has to end sometime," concluded the author of the post, which already has over 1,400 likes. An oil tanker in the bay of Matanzas in Havana, Cuba, February 16, 2026. Photo: EPA 05. A Mexican Navy ship arrives in Havana Bay with humanitarian aid, Cuba, February 12, 2026. Photo: Yamil Lage / AFP / Scanpix / LETA. According to the Observatory of Social Rights (ODS), which publishes annual reports based on population surveys, 89% of Cuban families live in extreme poverty. 55% choose the answer "I even have trouble buying the most basic necessities for survival," and another 27% say "My income is enough to survive, but not enough to afford anything beyond the bare essentials." Seven out of ten Cubans are forced to skip at least one of their three daily meals. 14% of those over 70 continue to work after retirement to survive. The disapproval rating of the government's economic and social policies is a record 92%. The survey for this study was conducted in the summer of 2025. The figures are likely even higher now. More Turbulent Than the '90s Cubans over 40 recall the term "special period" with dread. This term refers to the most difficult period in Cuba's modern history to date – the 1990s, when the collapse of the USSR and the socialist bloc led to a deep economic crisis on the island. From 1990 to 1993, Cuba's gross national product decreased by 35%, exports by 79%, and imports by 76%. Moscow at the time had neither the means nor the desire to support its ally at the previous level, pushing many Cubans to the brink of survival. Meanwhile, the current crisis is in many ways harsher. As the portal Havana Times noted, "the fall into the abyss then was not as sharp as it is now": the authorities were prepared for problems, the infrastructure – from sugar mills to power plants – had not yet collapsed, pork production was developing, and tourism and remittances from abroad were growing. And then, in 1999, Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela, becoming the main external pillar of the Cuban regime. The situation is different now. One of the problems is serious social stratification. Cubans have emerged on the island who have become wealthy by obtaining import licenses. At the same time, the majority continue to live in poverty. "The crisis affects all generations, but especially those who created the revolution and responded to calls to forgo personal gain for the common good. They were the ones who voluntarily went to cut cane [in 1970. – Ed.] during the '10 million tons' campaign, expecting the state to provide them with food and medicine for the rest of their lives," described the situation journalist Ruarid Nicol, who lives on the island. He stated: "The revolution lifted many out of poverty – that is its great achievement. But now it has made them poor again." Spanish economist Marc Vidal pointed out that now, "while the population faces growing poverty, prolonged power outages, and food shortages, the elite associated with the military apparatus concentrates significant resources outside public control." He is convinced that the narrative that the depth of the current crisis is solely due to the American embargo is deeply flawed. "The special period was very bad because there was no food. But there was hope," Cuban film producer Carlos Bustamante was quoted as saying by The Guardian. "Now there is food if you can afford it, but there is no hope." A Mexican Navy ship arrives in Havana Bay with humanitarian aid, Cuba, February 12, 2026. Photo: Yamil Lage / AFP / Scanpix / LETA. Countering Threats The situation is likely to improve only if the Donald Trump administration makes another unexpected maneuver and – as has happened before in relations with other countries – radically changes its tactics. The current oil blockade is based on the executive order "On Countering Threats to the United States from the Government of Cuba," signed by Trump on January 29, 2026. The document aligns with the US National Security Strategy updated last year, which breathed new life into the Monroe Doctrine (regarding the Western Hemisphere as an exclusive US sphere of influence). With his decree, Trump put into effect a "national emergency" regime, justifying it by an "extraordinary and unusual threat" to US national security and foreign policy from the Cuban leadership. The Trump administration has presented Havana with a list of accusations, including "systematic human rights violations," "regional destabilization," and "close ties with a number of hostile states and unfriendly actors," including the Russian Federation, PRC, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. For example, as noted by the White House, "Cuba hosts the largest radiotechnical intelligence center outside of Russia, aimed at collecting sensitive information about US national security." However, it is not specified what this refers to. Such a center – in Cuban Lourdes – did exist, but it was closed by a decree from Vladimir Putin back in 2002. No new similar structures have been publicly reported. "Trump's January decree qualitatively changed the regime of sanctions pressure that had existed since the early 1960s. Washington considered Cuba a source of military threat and – since 1982 – a "state sponsor of terrorism," but did not interfere with third countries' cooperation with Havana. Now, the US has activated an extraterritorial coercion mechanism. The key tool of pressure has become the threat of imposing tariffs on goods from any country that "directly or indirectly" supplies oil or petroleum products to Cuba. Authority to identify such countries was delegated to Trade Minister Howard Lattnik, and the determination of tariff rates to Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Havana's trading partners found themselves in a difficult choice between further supporting Cuba and maintaining relations with the US. Neither Venezuela nor Mexico The first blow to Havana's allies was struck even before the decree – on January 3, 2026, when the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro by US special forces shattered the Caracas-Havana axis. "Cuba has lived for many years on large volumes of oil and money from Venezuela. In return, Cuba provided 'security services' to the last two Venezuelan dictators, BUT THIS IS NO LONGER THE CASE... No more oil and no more money for Cuba - ZERO!" Trump wrote on his Truth Social account on January 11. Cuba's daily needs are about 110,000 barrels of oil. The island itself produces at most a third of this volume. Until early 2026, Venezuela was Havana's main support in this regard (and in many others). In the last quarter of 2025, an average of 35,000 barrels of oil per day came from there to Cuba. This is far from the 90,000 barrels during the heyday of Venezuelan-Cuban friendship under Hugo Chavez, but still significant. In turn, Cuba supplied Venezuela with medics and security forces for years. It is worth recalling that 32 Cubans guarding the presidential residence and the head of state himself were killed during the capture of Nicolas Maduro. When power passed to Vice President Delsy Rodríguez (now acting president), Venezuela stopped oil supplies to Cuba. There are also no humanitarian aid deliveries. In Caracas, a process has begun that local media calls "de-Cubanization": the new administration is dismantling structures of Cuban influence in intelligence and the armed forces, depriving Havana not only of oil but also of a crucial tool for geopolitical projection of power in the region. Moreover, according to the Mexican portal La Politica Online, during a February meeting with US Secretary of Energy Christopher Wright, Delsy Rodríguez assured him that Venezuela could assist in the transitional process in Cuba and promised to ask Havana to begin releasing political prisoners. "The next task for the US was to increase pressure on Mexico, which supplied Cubans with about 20,000 barrels of oil per day. Mexico faces its own risks: Trump threatened attacks on the country's territory in the fight against drug trafficking. And this is not to mention Trump's favorite tool – tariffs. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum publicly took a tough stance, calling US sanctions "extremely unfair." But oil supplies to Cuba have stopped. Instead of oil tankers, Mexico sent 800 tons of humanitarian aid to the island: beans, powdered milk, canned tuna, vegetable oil, and so on. This gesture allowed Sheinbaum to at least partially save face before the left-wing electorate demanding solidarity with Havana, without crossing the "red line" drawn by the White House. Cuba is Far Away Other strategic allies of Havana – Moscow and Beijing – also found themselves in a difficult situation. On the one hand, they cannot remain silent. On the other hand, the real economic capabilities and strategic priorities of both powers force them to be as cautious as possible, limiting themselves to symbolic gestures and humanitarian aid. During his visit to Moscow on February 18-19, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla heard many words of "resolute condemnation of Washington's illegitimate prohibitive steps against Havana" from his interlocutors in the Kremlin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Security Council, the State Duma, and the Federation Council. "Together with the majority of the world community, we call on the United States to show common sense, a responsible approach, and refrain from plans for a naval blockade of the Island of Freedom," said, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. "We do not accept anything like this," Vladimir Putin commented on the US actions. The Russian Embassy in Havana previously stated that Russia is preparing to supply oil and petroleum products to Cuba as humanitarian aid. The previous large-scale delivery took place in February 2025, amounting to 100,000 tons (about 733,000 barrels). But that was before Trump's decree. If a new delivery takes place, despite all economic and political risks, it is unlikely to be significantly larger. But the main thing is that Moscow will be able to state that they promised "not to abandon Cuba" and did not abandon it. Beijing's position is even more pragmatic. China remains Cuba's second-largest trading partner, but the volume of its aid is strictly limited by risk assessment. In response to the crisis, China sent food aid to Havana and provided a financial grant of about $80 million. However, China is in no hurry to support Cuba's energy sector, especially since it itself recently purchased oil from Cuba (part of the proceeds from Venezuela was resold to obtain much-needed hard currency for Havana). The key deterrent for China remains the same – an unwillingness to directly confront the US in its "backyard" for an asset of questionable value. "The Cuban leadership is trying in every way to mitigate the crisis. For example, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla traveled not only to Moscow but also to Madrid, where on February 16 he agreed on humanitarian aid supplies worth 1 million euros. In addition, the country's authorities have liberalized oil import rules: small private companies have been allowed to import fuel (with strict state control, of course). According to sources from the Miami-based publication Martí Noticias, private individuals have already engaged in this activity in an atmosphere of total secrecy, as there are fears that the Trump administration might cut off this channel as well. A man transports boxes on a cart in Havana, Cuba, February 17, 2026. Photo: Ramon Espinosa / AP / Scanpix / LETA. But these are all attempts to patch holes in a rapidly sinking ship. It Does Not Attack or Threaten The question is whether the US intends to sink this ship, and if so, by what methods. Donald Trump has repeatedly said that the Cuban government is experiencing "serious problems" and is "hanging by a thread." At the same time, he once admitted that it is impossible to increase pressure on Cuba further – unless "to blow this place up to hell." But there is no serious preparation for such a scenario yet. "If I were to do that [carry out a military operation. – Ed.], it would not be a very difficult operation, as you understand," Trump said on February 16. He added, "But I don't think it will be necessary." Against this backdrop, the Cuban administration has relaunched the old strategy known as "people's war." The plan, developed more than 40 years ago by Fidel Castro in case of confrontation with Washington, involves mass mobilization of the population and the creation of popular militias. Since the beginning of 2026, Cuban authorities have introduced a weekly military training day: Cubans are taught to set mines and throw grenades, and are introduced to the basics of military medicine and camouflage. However, similar exercises were regularly conducted in Venezuela in the months preceding the American attack, but this did not help Nicolas Maduro. If we hypothetically consider the possibility of a full-scale operation, Cuba is in an even less enviable position than Venezuela: approximately 49,000 regular troops versus 123,000, and much less modern equipment than the Bolivarian Republic. However, there are advantages: as the Chatham House think tank noted, the Cuban regime is ideologically cohesive and homogeneous, while Maduro's Venezuelan regime was fragmented into factions driven by purely selfish interests. Furthermore, the analysis claimed that Cuban officials and security forces, unlike their Venezuelan counterparts, "have undergone institutional ideological training in the spirit of the revolution and fear change." In Search of a Confidant However, the US is confident that there are people within the Cuban leadership who are ready – like Delsy Rodríguez in Venezuela – to become conduits for American policy. At the end of January, The Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is looking for a figure within the Cuban government who will help overthrow the current authorities by the end of 2026. And in mid-February, in an interview with Telemundo, the head of the US mission in Cuba, Mike Hammer, hinted that "the Cuban Delsy Rodríguez" has already been found. At the same time, he smiled and did not answer clarifying questions about who this could be. Antonio de la Cruz, director of the analytical organization Interamerican Trend, suggests that the head of the transitional government could be the current Vice President of the National Assembly, Ana María Mari Machado – a person with a less tarnished reputation than many other representatives of the Cuban establishment. According to the expert, the government could also include current Prime Minister Manuel Marrero, experienced diplomat Josefina Vidal, and Vice Prime Minister (and great-nephew of Fidel and Raul Castro) Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga. The Spanish publication El País highlighted the latter, calling him a potential leading contender for the role of "the Cuban Delsy Rodríguez." Alejandro Castro Espin. Photo: Alamy / Vida Press. Those who follow signals in the highest echelons of Cuban power are paying attention to another member of the Castro family – 60-year-old Alejandro Castro Espín. He is the son of Raul Castro and nephew of Fidel. El País called him the "architect of rapprochement with Washington" during Obama's presidency and a skilled negotiator. During Raul Castro's rule, his son was an influential figure in the state security system, but then, for reasons not fully understood, disappeared from public view. It is assumed that he became another victim of the "Pajama" plan – the Cuban term for the quiet removal from power, disguised as gratitude, of those who are no longer needed by the regime or have become too independent. In any case, in October 2024, Alejandro Castro Espín appeared on television for the first time in almost seven years, which many interpreted as a telling signal. And now, according to some reports, Raul's son is playing a key role: the Spanish newspaper ABC reported, citing sources in the Mexican government, about contacts on Mexican territory between Alejandro Castro Espín and representatives of the US special services. Meanwhile, sources for the American publication Axios reported a different version on February 18: the key figure communicating with the US side (specifically, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio) is 41-year-old Raul Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, Raul's grandson. According to one source, this younger generation representative is "his grandfather's favorite," served as his bodyguard, and, importantly, has allies at the head of the giant military-business conglomerate GAESA. "This is essentially a state within a state that manages a significant portion of the national economy and controls a substantial part of Cuba's foreign exchange earnings. The Cuban government asserts that there is no established dialogue between the two countries at the highest or even mid-level. "I would call this not so much 'negotiations' as 'discussions' about the future," a high-ranking US administration official, who asked not to be named, told Axios in turn. "Our position is that the regime must go. But how exactly this will happen is up to President Trump, and he has not yet made a decision." More Freedom Needed The President himself has confirmed the fact of Americans communicating with people "at the very top" of Cuba's power system. And he noted that Cubans "definitely need to make a deal" with the US. What exactly it might consist of is unknown. According to ABC sources, during initial exchanges of views with Alejandro Castro Espín, the possibility of "lifting the blockade of the Cuban economy" by the US was discussed. It is claimed that the White House might consider abandoning this pressure mechanism in exchange for allowing American companies access to strategic sectors of the Cuban economy – energy, tourism, banking, and telecommunications. According to Mexican officials cited by the publication, the first positive signal of progress could be the resumption of US oil supplies to Cuba. However, it is likely that if such talks were held, they were about a partial easing of the blockade. The relevant 1996 law ties the hands of even the US president. Congress can only lift the embargo on Cuba if a number of conditions are met: the removal of all members of the Castro family from power, the release of political prisoners, the restoration of rights and freedoms, and movement towards multi-party elections. At January hearings in the Senate, Marco Rubio pointed precisely to the aspect that lifting the embargo is possible only in the event of a regime change in Cuba. Meanwhile, in mid-February, discussing the situation around Cuba, he spoke about the importance of "the people of Cuba having more freedom, not only political but also economic." "I think their [Cuban authorities'. – Ed.] willingness to start taking steps in this direction is one possible way forward," said the Secretary of State. Fidel Castro depicted at a farmers' market in Havana, Cuba, February 17, 2026. Photo: Ernesto Mastrascusa / EPA. He did not go into details about the specific steps needed to ease sanctions, stating that such announcements require "space and time to do it right." However, the emphasis on economic freedoms in itself speaks volumes, especially since Rubio, who has Cuban roots, has always been the main "hawk" in US policy towards Cuba and previously showed no readiness for compromises that would allow the Diaz-Canel government to survive. "What Rubio is proposing is the most sensible, prudent, and humane path: to stimulate change through an economic solution," Miami Herald quoted former Congressman Joe Garcia, a Democrat from South Florida who had previously tried to mediate between the two governments. "In a sense, this is what the Cuban regime has been trying to achieve but failed due to incompetence and fear of losing control." Choice Between Poland and Vietnam In recent years, the Cuban authorities have indeed made attempts to liberalize the economic system. For example, opportunities for private businesses have been gradually expanded. However, radical changes have not occurred. In the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, Cuba ranks 175th, ahead of only North Korea. The ranking's compilers noted that "Cuba's inefficient state-run economy shows very weak results," "the lack of an independent and fair judicial system undermines the rule of law," "strict state control hinders the development of the private sector," "the application of regulations is inconsistent and non-transparent," and "monetary stability is vulnerable to state intervention." Experts consider two models for the transition from socialism to a market economy. The first is the Polish model, where the sharp collapse of the socialist system led to the formation of a market democratic society. It is noteworthy that the first president of Poland, Lech Wałęsa, who played a key role in the fall of the communist regime, is willing to share his experience with Cubans. On February 12, he spoke on this topic in Florida at the Museum of Cuban Diaspora. The main message was that Trump is "moving in the right direction," but it must be remembered that he is "acting in the interests of the US, not Cuba." Therefore, Cubans themselves, Wałęsa noted, must take the initiative and achieve changes on the island, and then cope with the serious challenges of rebuilding a deeply divided nation. The second model, which does not involve a radical overhaul of the system, is the Vietnamese model. In the late 1980s, Vietnam began market reforms without touching the one-party political system. This led to success. As late as 1993, 80% of Vietnamese lived in poverty. By 2006, this figure had decreased to 51%, and today it is only 3%. While Vietnam's economic freedom ranking is above the global average (61st out of 176), the communist party's hegemony is not threatened. "The question is whether the Cuban leadership has enough self-confidence and willingness to take risks by reforming the economy so radically. So far, they have shown little readiness for this. And it is even less likely that the authorities will agree to significant socio-political liberalization. In Cuba, as under the Castro brothers, dissent is still harshly suppressed. The latest high-profile example is the arrest in early February of two founders of the project El4tico, popular among young people – video columns about the country's problems distributed on social media. They face up to eight years in prison for "inciting the alteration of the constitutional order and slander of the activities of political and public institutions of the country." Cuban authorities, not without reason, see a threat to their position in the expansion of political freedoms and in a large-scale amnesty. And they will likely resist this as long as they can."
